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STATEMENT OF FACTS
rn July 1979, Plaintiffs Chad, Ray and Paul Spor met in
with John (Jacki Larsen, chairman of the
noard of directors of Defendant Crested Butte Mining Company.
JJring this and a second meeting in July, a venture was
discussed wnich entailed the contribution of certain equipment
claims by Respondents and the contribution of a

, 0 j

(peanut mill) and acquisition of a heavy media
sink-float plant by Appellant, Crested Butte,

Crested Butte

•as to also provide financing of the venture.

The

:ontrioutions were to be made to a corporation (Gold Spor
Company) which was incorporated by the Spors in late
1979.

:"lj,

so-called "preincorporation agreement" was prepared by
Bjtte and signed by Respondents Spor in December 1979.
:rested Butte signed about January 2, 1980.

(Exh. P-12).

as required by the preincorporation agreement,
to transfer the equipment and mining claims to Gold
3For

Company in exchange for stock.

In February, 1980,

Spor wrote to Harold Herron that he had "just about
-:::i;;leted

instruments necessary to

convey the

properties to be conveyed by Spors into Gold Spor
•:1ing coripany.•

1::xh. P-161.

to Gold Spor
r;,

:he peanut

All of the Spor property was
company and stock was issued to

was never transferred by Crested Butte,

plant was ever acquired by it; and no stock was
JJ Appellant Crested Butte.
-1-

on May 30, 1980, the attorney for Respondents Spor wrote to
the attorney for crested Butte referring to a telephone
conversation of May 8, 1980.

The letter ( Exh. P-17) referred

to crested Butte's failure to transfer the mill or obtain a
plant.

The letter proposed that a release be executed

releasing, inter-alia, any claim Crested Butte might claim in
Gold spor.

Prior to this time $125,000.00 of a required

$150,000.00 had been loaned to Gold Spor by Crested Butte
pursuant to the terms of the •preincorporation agreement.•

The

preincorporation agreement called for this to be repaid over
five years.

The letter offered to prepay this loan with

interest.
A meeting wa.s held on August 18, 1980 between Spars, their
counsel, and Mr. Larsen and counsel for Crested Butte wherein a
rescission of the preincorporation agreement was discussed.
The paties' agreement resolved all issues except the prepayment
date of the loan.

Following the meeting, crested Butte's

counsel wrote to Spar's counsel, the letter stating that
Crested Butte was "awaiting Spar's response regarding our final
offer on the prepayment of the loan.•

(Exh. P-18).

On September 15, 1980 a check in the amount of $9,052.43
was sent to Crested Butte with a letter stating the entire loan
would be paid by April 1, 1981.
On October 6, 1980 crested Butte wrote purporting to reject
the tender claiming that the tender was not in accordance with
the discussion held on August 18, 1980.
was never returned.
-2-

The check, however,

on October 13, 1980, counsel for Spors wrote stating that
the payment was in accord with the August 18 meeting and asked
foe an explanation of Crested Butte's
agreement to the contrary.

understanding of any

On October 17, 1980, Mr. Evans of

crested Butte wrote stating that the amount was to have been
paid "shortly after" the August 18 meeting.
On October 29, counsel for the Spors wrote stating that
there was no "shortly after" condition to the August 18
discussion.

On November 3, 1980, another letter and a check in

the amount of $10,849.40 was sent.

Monthly payments continued

to be paid to crested Butte until May 22, 1981 when the final
installment was sent with a release (attached to Exh. P-29).
On May 22, 1981, Gold Spor's legal counsel wrote to Jack
Larsen of Crested Butte stating that all checks had cleared the
bank except the check dated November 3, 1980.

(Exh. P-29).

The letter asked for the check to be deposited; a release was
included in the letter whereby Crested Butte was to release any
claim in Gold spor.

On June 9, 1981 a replacement check was

requested by Crested Butte.

No mention of the release was

made.
On June 19, 1981, a replacement check in the amount of
$10,849.40 was sent, together with a second copy of the
release.

This check was retained and cashed by crested Butte.

The release was not returned, instead ten days later Crested
Butte demanded one-half of the stock of Gold Spor.
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ARGUMENT
The preincorporation agreement required Crested Butte to
•transfer, assign and deliver• certain equipment, i.e., peanut
mill and heavy media sink-float plant, to the new corporation.
This crested Butte failed to do.

The preincorporation

agreement required the Spors to contribute certain personal and
real property, which they did.

Both Crested Butte and Spors

agreed on August 18, 1980 to rescind the preincorporation
agreement and that Spors would prepay the loan from Crested
Butte.

Pursuant to the terms of rescission decided upon at the

meeting, Spors prepaid by over four years the $125,000.00 loan
it had received from crested Butte with interst.

Crested Butte

accepted the offer of rescission by subsequently cashing each
loan installment check; even asking for a replacement check
which it cashed, but failed to sign two releases which had been
sent along with the final two installment payments.

The

alleged misconduct of the Spors has nothing to do with the
August 18, 1980 rescission agreement which did not commence
until three months later.

No relationship exists between the

alleged misconduct and the rescission.

For the following

reasons, Spors pray that the district court's judgment be
affirmed.
POINT I
CRESTED BUTTE'S ACCEPTANCE AND CASHING OF THE EARLY
PREPAYMENT MONIES CONSTITUTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE SPORS'
RESCISSION OFFER AND AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OF THE
ENTIRE PREINCORPORATION AGREEMENT
Appellant contends that a factual dispute exists •as to
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whether or not an accord and satisfaction occurred between the
parties rescinding the preincorporation contract.•
(Appellant's brief at 10).

Appellant crested Butte breaks down

its argument into two subparts:

(1) Crested Butte considered

repayment of the loan, not as consideration for a rescission or
an accord and satisfaction, but as a precondition to
settlement; and (2) Crested Butte's acceptance of the loan
prepayments did not work an accord and satisfaction of its
claim for a 50% interest in the Gold Spor Mining Company.

By

way of response, Respondents argue that an offer to rescind was
made by the Spors to Crested Butte which was accepted by
crested Butte's (1) cashing of the repayment checks; (2)
receipt of a written release (in addition to the release
printed on the back of the final repayment check) to be
executed along with the final repayment check; (3) requesting a
replacement check in accordance with the May 22, 1981 letter;
(4) receipt of the replacement check along with a second copy
of the release with another request that it be executed; and
(5) acceptance of the check and while ignoring the release.
Respondents also argue that the context in which the
prepayments were made, considering the actions and
correspondence of the parties, evidence an intention of the
parties to rescind the preincorporattion agreement.

A review

of the evidence indicates that the acceptance of the checks
constitutes an accord and satisfaction.
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A.
Did Gold Spor Mining Company pay Crested Butte four
years in advance just so it could enter into further
negotiations with crested Butte regarding the termination
the preincorporation agreement?
on May 30, 1980, Richard Lawrence, legal counsel for Gold
Spor Mining Company, wrote to Daniel P. Svilar, legal counsel
for Defendant Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc. stating:
In view of this and your phone conversation with Paul
spor on approximately May 8, 1980, our clients are led to
believe that your client desires to terminate the previous
agreement with them. (Exh. P-17) (emphasis added).
The statement that as of May 30, 1980 Gold Spor Mining Company
had notified Crested Butte that it understood Crested Butte
desired to terminate the preincorporation agreement is
undisputed.
accomplished.

The same letter proposed how this might be
In pertinent part, the proposals were:

1.

Resignation of two crested Butte personnel from the
Board of Directors. (In point of fact, there is no
indication that either of them were ever elected as a
director).

2.

Crested Butte would furnish a release releasing any
and all interest they may have had or may have in Gold
Spor Mining Company and the assets transferred to it
by the Spors.

3.

Gold Spor Mining Company would repay a $125,000.00
loan Crested Butte had made by July 1, 1984.

4.

Gold Spor would furnish Crested Butte with a release
of any and all liability Which they may have as a
result of any breach of the agreement to incorporate.
(Exh. P-17) (emphasis added).

From Mr. Svilar's letter of August 21, 1980, it is evident
that the parties did in fact meet on August 18, 1980 to
consider termination of the preincorporation agreement.
this same letter (Exh. P-18), Mr. Svilar responded to Mr.
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In

Lawrence's statement that Crested Butte had breached the
preincorporation agreement stating •crested Butte is ready,
willing and able to complete• the terms of the preincorporation
agreement "when and if" the parties could resolve certain
issues.

There is no evidence that these issues were ever

resolved or that the parties ever attempted to do so.
In reference to the August meeting in Salt Lake City, Mr.
svilar states "[W]e are also awaiting your response regarding
our final offer on the
(emphasis added).

of the loan.•

Why had

(Exh. P-18)

been discussed?

Mr.

Lawrence's letter of May 30, 1980 had proposed only repayment
within the time provided by the preincorporation agreement,
i.e., 1984.

There is no indication from the record that apart

from a rescission that crested Butte was entitled to prepayment
of its loan.

Crested Butte had not agreed to repayment by 1984

and had demanded prepayment prior to 1984 and had demanded as
much at the August 18, 1980 meeting.

Examination of the other

correspondence (Exh. P-17 through P-31) reveals that
'prepayment of the loan•

was the only issue regarding

rescission which may not have been fully resolved at the August
18, 1980 meeting.

The correspondence after the August 18, 1980

meeting between the parties makes no further mention of the
other proposals for rescission submitted by Mr. Lawrence in his
letter dated May 30, 1980 and leads to the conclusion that all
issues but prepayment of the loan had been resolved.
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In response to Mr. Svilar's inquiry regarding "prepayment
of the loan•, Mr. Lawrence responded by letter dated September
15, 1980 and by tendering a check in the amount of $9,052.43
stating that the full balance with interest would be repaid
within six and one-half months.

(Exh. P-19).

on October 6, 1980, Max Evans, President of Crested Butte
stated, •we reject this tender as not being in accordance with
what was discussed in Salt Lake City on August 18, 1980."
(Exh. P-20).

Even so, the tender was accepted; the check was

retained and cashed.

By way of response, Mr. Lawrence wrote to

Mr. Evans and explained that the prepayment schedule he had
outlined was not inconsistent with the terms of the August
meeting.

He further stated that the Spors would continue to

pay as he had previously outlined.

(Exh. P-23).

Mr. Lawrence

also stated that "[I]f you believe the terms of any agreement
to be different than as set forth in my prior letter, please
indicate to me in writing your understanding of any agreement.'
(Exh. P-21).

Crested Butte apparently did not disagree with

Mr. Lawrence's explanation and continued to accept subsequent
tenders.

For example, when the Spors tendered another payment

in November there was no sign of a rejection from Crested
Butte.

(Exh. P-24).

Nor was there any sign of a rejection

from Crested Butte when the other monthly payments were made.
In fact, the checks were cashed without comment.
through P-28).
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(Exh. P-23

on May 22, 1981, counsel for Gold Spar Mining company wrote
to Mr. Larsen tendering a release signed by respondents stating:
[S]ince the full repayment of this loan is the final matter
to be taken care of in regard to the Gold Spar Company
matters with crested Butte I have prepared and enclosed a
Receipt and Release for signature by Crested Butte.
(Exh.
P-29)
(emphasis added)
spors' counsel also requested that the check sent with the
November 3, 1980 letter be cashed.

(Exh. P-29)

Instead of

notifying Spars' counsel that Crested Butte rejected this
tender as a full release from the preincorporation agreement,
crested Butte requested another check be issued.
did not mention the release.

Crested Butte

The tendered release (Exh. P-29)

shows what the Spars' intent was.

(See Appendix "A").

Without

any notice of disagreement with the release or the Spors'
intent, crested Butte requested a replacement check to make
prepayment complete.

(Exh. P-30).

Pursuant to Crested Butte's request, the Spars issued a
replacement check and tendered it along with a second executed
copy of the release.

(Exh. P-31).

At this point no one can

logically maintain that the Spars' intent was anything but
clear that a rescission was intended.
The issue presented by the actions of the parties is "What
did Crested Butte do with this check and the release that would
indicate that it was not accepting Gold Spor's offer?"

crested

3utte accepted the check, cashed it and subsequently purported
to refuse the condition upon which it was offered.
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Appellant contends that the evidence is conflicting as to
whether an offer to rescind was ever made.

To support this

contention Appellant refers the Court to Mr. Svilar's
deposition testimony to support their contention that •crested
Butte demanded immediate repayment, not as a term of
settlement, but as a precondition of settlement.•
Brief, p. 11).

(Appellant's

The record is absent of any testimony or

statement upon which the parties had agreed Gold Spor Mining
Company was paying crested Butte four years in advance just so
it could enter into further negotiations with Crested Butte
regarding the termination of the preincorporation agreement.
In fact, Mr. Larsen's testimony advances the fact that there
was no such agreement.

He did not consider the repayments as a

precondition to "further settlement negotiations• as Appellant
suggests:
A.

• • we wanted immediate return of that money and if
we got immediate return of that money, we might be
able to terminate all our agreements.

Q.

You might be able to?

A.

Cash right now and if you do anything different, we're
not sure.

Q.

So a precondition to even discussing that with the
board of directors was an immediate repayment of all
the money?

A.

That's right. If he had made that offer, we would
have taken it to the board of directors and we would
have probably got it resolved, but that did not
happen.
(J. Larsen Depo. at 77-78)
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(emphasis added)

ro assert that the parties had agreed upon prepayment as a
precondition to further settlement negotiations is not
supported by the evidence and is without merit.
Moreover, prepayment of the loan amount by Gold Spor was
not a precondition of settlement.

The plan formulated by

crested Butte was to accept all of the payments and then
commence litigation:
Q.

Now I take it the checks were not cashed as they came
in, is that correct?

A.

That's true.

Q.

Why were they held before they were cashed?

A.

I just told you. I suggested we don't cash them and
mark void on them and after I talked to Mr. Hooper,
he said we ought to get the money we could and then
file litigation.
(J. Larsen Depo. at 69)

(emphasis added)

Appellant's assertion that Respondents prepay the loan four
years in advance as a precondition to entering into settlement
negotiations with crested Butte is without support in the
record and in the words of Mr. Larsen simply •aid not happen.•

B.
Did Crested Butte's acceptance of the loan prepayments
work an accord and satisfaction of its claim for a 50% interest
in Gold Spor Mining Company?
Appellant argues that its acceptance of the early loan
payments did not constitute an accord and satisfaction of its
claim for a 50% interest in Gold Spor Mining company.
making this argument,

In

failed to indicate (1) the
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background and circumstances which reveals the intent of the
parties; and (2) any mention of the written release which
accompanied the last installment payment and replacement
check.

Respondents argue (1) that an accord and satisfaction

was reached settling all disputes between the parties; ( 2) that
the consideration given was early prepayment of crested Butte's
loan and resolution of disputed claims (i.e., when and if
crested Butte was to perform its obligations under the
preincorporation agreement); and (3) that the sending of the
prepayment checks and crested Butte's cashing of those checks
while ignoring the releases, gave a plain definite indication
of the Spors' intent to rescind which Crested Butte cannot deny,
As a general principle of law, there may be an oral
rescission of a written contract.
1276, 1278 (Wash. App. 1979).

Knapp v. Hoerner, 591 P.2d

As stated in West River

Equipment co. v. Holzworth Construction Company, 335 P.2d 298
(Mont. 1958):
The parties to the executory written agreement were
privileged to terminate it at any time by mutual consent
independently of any express agreement so providing and it
is immaterial whether such termination be characterized as
abandonment, cancellation, mutual rescission or waiver.
The effect is the same--to relieve the parties from going
forward under the written instrument, and this may be
accomplished by parol, and the fact of its having been done
established by evidence of the acts and declarations of the
parties. • • •
There can be no question but what a contract may be
mutually abandoned or modified by the parties at any stage
of performance, and each of the parties release from the
further obligation on account thereof; that it may be
accomplished by parol, and the fact of its having been done
established by evidence of the acts and declarations of the
parties.

-12-

It is clear then that a written contract may be canceled by
mutual consent and that the cancellation may be oral.

!9.·

at 301 (citations omitted).

The language of the West River court defines exactly what
occurred in the instant case.

Respondents and Appellant agreed

on August 18, 1980 to rescind the preincorporation agreement.
Appellant states in its letter of October 17, 1980 (Exh. P-22)
that the terms of the August 18, 1980 meeting required
prepayment of the loan Crested Butte had made shortly after the
meeting.

Appellant does not argue that this offer ever lapsed

or was withdrawn.

The fact is that prepayment of the loan

commenced on September 15, 1980 and continued until May 22,
1981.

At no time did Crested Butte reject these tenders, but

rather cashed each check.
The Oregon supreme Court was asked to decide in Edgley v.
Jackson, 276 or. 313, 554 P.2d 476 (1976) whether acceptance of
a check constituted acceptance of a rescission offer thereby
working an accord and satisfaction.

Edgley involved a seller

of real property attempting to rescind a land sale contract by
returning buyer's earnest money deposit.

on the back of the

check was written "Refund of Ernest [sic] money in full."
After numerous attempts to return the deposit and buyer's
successive rejections of the check, buyer endorsed the check
and deposited it.

Three days thereafter, buyer brought suit

against seller for specific performance under the contract.

At

trial, the buyer testified that by his endorsement of the check
he never intended to relinquish his rights under the sale
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agreement.

Id. at 478.

The court noted that buyer's filing

a lawsuit evidenced that intent.

of

In response, the court stated:

Nevertheless, in analogous situations, it has been held
that one who accepts and cashes a check which purports by
notation or by the terms upon which it was tendered to be
in full satisfaction of a disputed claim between the
parties has accepted the payment on those terms.
Id. at 478 (emphasis added)

See also Sims v. Veneman, 580 P.2d

466 (Nev. 1978); Reppert & Co. v. Plaid Pantries, Inc., 42
App. 313, 600 P.2d 494 (Or.App. 1979).

Or,

The Spors' intent was

evidenced, if not obvious from their counsel's correspondence,
by the executed release which detailed the terms upon which the
final payment was tendered.

Crested Butte accepted the check,

cashed it and like in Edgley refused •the terms upon which it
was tendered," i.e., failed to execute the release and then
threatened suit ten days later.
Appellant's acceptance of the payments and the terms upon
which it was tendered, constitues an acceptance of Respondents'
offer to rescind.

The Edgley court further stated:

A rescission of a contract, like an accord and
satisfaction, is accomplished by agreement of the parties,
whether expressed in words or manifested by conduct. In
either context, when one party says, in effect, •here is
your money; if you accept it it is understood that you have
no further claims against me,• and the other indicates
acceptance by taking and using the money, the acceptance is
final.
In the present case the writing on the check and the
prior dealings between the parties leave no doubt that the
defendants intended, by return of the $1,000, to terminate
the agreement. Plaintiffs must have understood this to be
the purpose of the refund. Acceptance and use of the
check, under the circumstances, amounted to acceptance of
defendants' offer to rescind.•
554 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added)
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1

Even if a meeting of the minds as to rescission had not been
reached in August of 1980, crested Butte's acceptance of the
prepayments with knowledge that those payments were being made
pursuant to Respondents' intent to rescind the agreement,
constitutes an acceptance of the rescission offer.
Appellant argues that no consideration was given to Crested
sutte for its abandonment of its interest in Gold Spor Mining
company.

It is a general principle of law that in the event of

an unliquidated claim, "consideration may rest upon the
settlement of a dispute • • • • • 1 Am Jur 2d Accord and
satisfaction §12; Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642
P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982); Cox Construction co., Inc. v. State
Road Commission, 583 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah, 1978); Ralph A. Badger
& co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Association, 75 P.2d 669

(Utah 1938).

Respondents' law suit involved a claim for breach

of contract.

(Exh. P.-17).

Appellant said that it would

perform its portion of the contract of the contract "when and
if" certain matters were agreed upon.

(Exh. P-18).

Respondents submit that settlement of such disputed claims
constituted consideration.

Appellant relies on Bennett v.

Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 417 P.2d 761 (1966), in which
this Court agreed with the proposition that "where there is a
dispute about a claim and one party makes an offer of
settlement which is accepted and performed by the other, that
an accord and satisfaction.•
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Id. at 764.

This

court declined to follow this general principle of law because
the particular facts of the Bennett case rendered the
principle's application inappropriate.

Respondents submit that

the facts of the instant case are unlike the facts in Bennett
and therefore warrant the principle's application.

Unlike the

plaintiff in Bennett, who upon receipt of the check approached
the defendant informing it that he did not regard the check as
payment in full and that other issues remained to be resolved,
Crested Butte accepted all payments by keeping the checks,
allowing Gold Spor to continue prepayment over a several month
period and asking for a replacement check in June while
remaining silent on the signed release it had received.
For Crested Butte's acceptance and cashing of the
prepayment checks and written releases to amount to an accord
and satisfaction of all claims, "the conditions must be plain,
definite and certain" that such check is in complete settlement
of the account between the parties and that acceptance thereof
shall close the account or controversy.
P.2d 402, 404 (Idaho 1979).

Ashby v. Hubbard, 593

Prepayment of the loan, the

written executed release and the conduct of the parties
evidence a "plain, definite and certain" indication that
prepayment was made in full satisfaction of an agreement to
rescind.

Specifically, Respondents' counsel wrote to

Appellant's president on October 13, 1980 stating:
You indicated in your letter [Exh. P-20] that the payment
received by you is not acceptable and is not in accordance
with the agreement made on August 18, 1980. I am not aware
of this payment being in any way different from the terms
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which were proposed at the meeting • • • • our client will
continue to pay under the terms set forth in my letter of
September 15, 1980.
(Exh. P-21).
subsequently, Respondents' counsel wrote again to Appellant's
president, stating:
My client will continue to pay as I have outlined in my
previous letters.
(Exh. P-23).
If the foregoing were for some reason insufficient to alert

Appellant that Respondents intended the prepayments to
constitute nothing less than a full rescission, even more plain
evidence exists.

On May 22, 1981, counsel for Respondents

wrote crested Butte stating the November 3, 1980 check in the
amount of $10,849.40 had not cleared the bank.

He further

stated:
Since the full repayment of this loan is the final matter
to be taken care of in regard to the Gold Spor Company
matters with Crested Butte, I have prepared and enclosed a
release for signature by Crested Butte. As soon as you
have deposited the check described above, please sign and
date both copies of the enclosed document and return one
copy to me.
(Exh. P-29) (emphasis added).
The release (See Appendix "A") had been signed by the Spors who

had executed the preincorporation agreement.

The release

stated that each party to the preincorporation agreement would
'waive and release any and all claims• against one another
arising from the preincorporation agreement "or out of any and
all actions or failures to act pursuant to said agreement,• or
'in connection with the incorporation and operationg of Gold
3por Mining Company prior to the date hereof."
Appellant responded asking that another
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Subsequently,

check be issued in the place of the November 3, 1980 check
(Exh. P-30).

In that letter, Appellant said nothing about the

written release.

This, however, would not have alerted anyone

of any intent on the part of crested Butte not to sign the
release because crested Butte had not been asked to sign and
return the release until after the check had been deposited.
(Exh. P-29).
On June 19, 1981, the replacement check was sent as
requested by crested Butte (Exh. P-31) along with a second copy
of the release asking for crested Butte's signatures on the
release.

crested Butte cashed the check but did not sign the

release.

One cannot read the release and imagine that an

accord and satisfaction was not intended.

Despite Respondents'

reliance upon the written executed release evidencing

accord

and satisfaction of the entire preincorporation agreement,
Appellant in its brief failed to mention the release and the
accompanying correspondence.
If an accord and satisfaction of the entire
preincorporation agreement was not intended, what value would
Gold Spor stock have to Crested Butte after the loan had been
prepaid?

Examination of the significance of the loan by

Crested Butte to the corporation leads one to logically
conclude that rescission of the entire agreement was intended.
The loan constituted the operating capital of Gold Spor Mining
Company.

The Spors contributed mineral properties which were

of no value without capital to exploit the potential mineral
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deposits.

Crested Butte was to contribute equipment which

would take money to purchase and rehabilitate.
allowed the loan to be

Appellant

to it when it knew that the

loaned funds were an essential part of the preincorporation
agreement and that with such funds being repaid there was no
way that the agreement could be completed.

Upon completing the

prepayments, Appellant had to know that even if a sink-float
plant acquisition and the peanut mill location were agreed upon
that the purposes of the agreement could not be carried out
because the loan--the means of paying expenses until the
project could be started--had been repaid to Appellant in
full.

The repayment of the loan monies by the Spars would

render the corporation lifeless to pursue its conceived
purpose.

The Spors' intent, as evidenced by the releases and

correspondence, was clear that the early payment of loan monies
constituted settlement of all claims that either party could
assert against each other.
Appellant arques •that nowhere in the correspondence of the
record • . • is it stated by the Spors or their representatives
that the tender of the checks was conditioned upon total
rescission of all aspects of the contract.•
brief, P. 15).

(Appellant's

A review of the correspondence and executed

release as referred to above, renders Appellant's assertion
without merit.
Appellant cites the court to the endorsement language on
the back of the March 30, 1981 repayment check (Exh. P-31) in
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support of its contention that only one of several respective
obligations of the parties to the contract had been resolved.
This assertion completely ignores the fact that Gold Spar
Mining Company was not a signatory to the preincorporation
agreement.

Gold Spor Mining Company had no reason to place a

more comprehensive endorsement condition on the back of its
check.
From the foregoing, the fact that Respondents' intent to
rescind the entire preincorporation agreement is clear.
Appellant is estopped from asserting that it did not agree to
rescind the contract.

"The doctrine of estoppel has as its

purpose to prevent injury arising from actions or declarations
which have been acted on in good faith and which would be
inequitable to permit a party to retract.•

Jankovsky v.

Halladay motors, 482 P.2d 129, 132 (Wyo. 1971).

In Celebritr

Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor control Commission, 602 P.2d 689
(Utah 1979), the court set forth the elements of estoppel as:
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the
claim afterwards asserted,
(2)
action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act, and
(3)
injury to such other party resulting from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such admission,
statement, or act.•
Id. at 694.
In the instant case, the first element of estoppel is
present by Appellant's oral agreement to rescind the
preincorporaton contract and/or its actions of accepting
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prepayment.

Likewise the second element is present in that

Respondents prepaid the loan relying upon Appellant's
statements and acts and proceeded to negotiate the lease of
mineral properties to Candelaria Metals within a few days of
the August 18, 1980 meeting in order to do so.

Lastly,

Respondents will be injured if the rescission is not enforced.
Appellant seeks to set aside the lease of the mineral
properties.

Candelaria has invested money in the leases and

will be caused to suffer injury if the lease is set aside.

To

allow Appellant to contend that it did not agree to rescind the
agreement results in injury to Respondent as well as Candelaria
Metals who has also acted in reliance on the lease.

The

elements of estoppel having been met, the Court should find
Appellant estopped from arguing that it did not agree to
rescind the contract.
Respondents' position is that Appellant could not (1)
receive the written release with the request that it be signed
by

crested Butte; (2) request a replacement check in accordance

with the May 22, 1981 letter; (3) receive the replacement check
along with a second copy of the release with another request
that it be executed; and (4) accept the check and ignore the
release.

Appellant would have the court conclude that Gold

Spor prepaid the loan (that was to constitute its operating
capital) four years in advance of its due date merely for the
privilege of entering into •further settlement negotiations".
Mr. Larsen himself testified that this "did not happen•.
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(J.

Larsen Depa. at 78).

In fact, the stated plan by Appellant Qs

to accept the checks and then sue.

(J. Larsen Depa. at 69).

Respor.dents contend that acceptance of the checks referred
to in the correspondence constitutes an accord and
satisfaction.

The point upon which there can be no doubt,

however, is the fact that Appellant could not receive Exhibits
P-19 and P-30, request and cash the checks referred to therein,
and then claim that it is not bound by the release.

The intnt

of the parties is shown by the correspondence, particularly the
releases.

The court should affirm the lower court's ruling

that the entire preincorporation agreement has been rescinded,
POINT II
THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES CANNOT
BE VITIATED BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF
FRAUD
Appellant contends that assuming that the preincorporation
agreement was rescinded, either expressly or by acquiescence,
any such rescission agreement was rendered unenforceable by the
Spars' alleged fraud.

Specifically, Appellant in Point II of

its brief identifies the alleged misconduct as:
1.

The Spars issued stock in Gold Spor Mining Company to
themselves and relatives before they had performed
under the preincorporation aqreement.

2.

The Spars allegedly gave only ineffectual notice of a
board meeting of Gold Spar to Crested Butte's
representatives on the board.

3.

Messrs. Larsen and svilar were barred from che second
board meeting and the Spars refused to relate the
substance of their agreement with Candelaria.

4.

Messrs. Evans and Herron knew nothing of the lease of
mineral properties with Candelaria.
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From these four allegations, the Court is asked to conclude
that there is a dispute of material fact on the question of
fraud which should be submitted to the trier of fact.

Even if

true, these claims do not warrant setting aside the accord and
satisfaction reached by the parties.

Respondents will examine

each claim in a light most favorable to Appellant and determine
whether it constitues a basis upon which it can contend that
the accord and satisfaction may be set aside.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that each of the four
claims relate to directors or board of directors meetings.

A

review of Article VIII of the Articles of Incorporation (as
prepared by crested Butte) reveals the names of the directors:
Chad Spor, Paul Spor and Ray Spor (Exh. D-1).

No other

individuals were elected, served, or added to the board.
Spor deposition at 47).

(Chad

Mr. Larsen never was at any time a

director of Gold Spor Mining company. (J. Larsen depo. at 10)
and there is no evidence that Mr. svilar served as a director
of Gold Spor Mining Company.
With respect to Appellant's first claim, it is true that
the board of directors issued stock to themselves and the other
plaintiffs who were to make capital contributions.

The record

would also reveal that the stock certificates may have been
dated a week or ten days ahead of final transfer of the capital
assets to the corporation.

The record indicates that Crested

Butte was aware that the transfers were being made.

Mr.

Svilar, legal counsel for Crested Butte, admits that he had
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knowledge of a written consent for the issuance of the stock to
the Spars and admits that he did not submit such a consent to
crested Butte.

(Svilar depo. at 22).

There is no dispute,

however, that Spars finalized all capital contributions within
days of the stock issue.

Crested Butte was to receive Gold

spor Mining company stock upon performance of its obligations
under the preincorporation agreement, i.e., transfer of the
peanut mill and acquisition of a heavy media sink-float plant.
(Exh. D-1 Section I, Para. l(b)).

Crested Butte stated in

writing however, that it was willing to convey the equipment to
the corporation only "when and if" certain essential terms
could be agreed upon.

(Exh. P-18).

Therefore, Crested Butte

was not entitled to receive its shares in Gold Spor according
to the terms of the preincorporation agreement.

The Spors had

performed all transfers and conveyances they were required to
do pursuant to the terms of the preincorporation agreement.
(Exh. P-16).

Most importantly, the misconduct allegation of

Appellant has nothing to do with rescission discussions which
did not even commence until three months later.

No harm came

to the corporation or any stockholders as a result of the stock
issuance and none has been alleged.
Appellant contends in its second, third and fourth claims
that the Spars gave only ineffectual notice of a board meeting;
Messrs. Larsen and Svilar were barred from the second meeting;
and that the Spors refused to discuss the substance of their
agreement with Candelaria.

In response, it must be remembered
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that Larsen and Svilar were not directors and taking the facts
most favorable to Appellant it is not alleged that they were
directors.

Respondents maintain that these gentlemen were not

barred from attending the meeting but that the directors
meeting had concluded.
With respect to Appellant's claim, specifically that the
spors refused to discuss the substance of their agrement with
Candelaria, Appellant argues that Larsen and Svilar demanded to
know the terms of the Candelaria contract.

However, Appellant

does not contend that the terms of the Candelaria contract had
been negotiated at that time.

Significantly, representatives

of crested Butte were informed of the negotiations between Gold
spor and Candelaria.

Mr. Svilar admitted that he was aware

that Gold Spor was considering selling its principal assets.
(Svilar depo. at 20-21, 25).

Mr. svilar came to be apprised of

the proposed sale in a telephone conversation with Paul Spor in
May of 1980.

Also in mid-May 1980, Chad Spor informed Mr.

Larsen that negotiations were being entered into. (Paul Spor
depo. at 23-24).

As previously stated, neither Mr. Evans nor

Mr. Herron ever served as a director.
47).

(Chad Spor depo. at

The record before the court is insufficient to raise even

a hint that the directors failed to fulfill their duty to the
corporation and its shareholders.
Appellant's argument that the alleged accord and
satisfaction is voidable because it was tainted by fraud must
fail.

Respondents disclosed to representatives of Crested
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Butte, Messrs. Larsen and Svilar, that negotiations were
place with Candelaria.

Appellant fails to cite from the record

that this was not the case.
Although Appellant has argued that the four claims of
misconduct tainted the accord and satisfaction, it has failed
to demonstrate a relationship between these acts and the
rescission discussions which occurred three months later in
August 1980.

Moreover, Crested Butte accepted early loan

prepayments all the while being aware and having knowledge of
the acts of misconduct or fraud which it alleges in its brief.
Such knowledge of misconduct did not prevent Crested Butte froo
accepting the prepayment checks and the release.
Respondents sent a letter containing a release to Crested
Butte in May 1981 (Exh. P-29) Crested Butte requested that a
replacement check be sent (Exh. P-30).

A replacement check aM

a second copy of the release (executed by Respondents to be
executed by Appellant) was sent in June. (Exh. P-31).

Ten dap

after receipt of the replacement check, Crested Butte gave
notice of its intention to sue (Exh. P-32).

There is

absolutely no indication of any kind that anything happened
during that ten-day period which would excuse crested Butte's
acceptance of the last check.
POINT III
THE ALLEGED FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS INCIDENT TO
THE RESCISSION AND ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DO NOT
PRESENT A QUESTION OF MATERIAL FACT
Appellant asserts that two material issues of fact were
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improperly ruled upon by the trial court.

First, was there a

meeting of the minds that repayment of the loan by Gold Spor
worked an accord and satisfaction to release the Spors from the
other provisions of the preincorporation agreement.

Second,

the trier of fact must be allowed to determine whether the
spars alleged misconduct contributed to Crested Butte's
acceptance of the rescission offer.
Appellant's first assertion of the existence of a material
fact goes to the heart of what the parties had agreed upon and
intended.

There can be no misunderstanding that Respondents

desired to rescind their agreement with Crested Butte.

Such

intent is evidenced by the May 30, 1980 letter of Spors'
counsel (Exh. P-17).

The parties met on August 18, 1980 to

discuss the proposals in Mr. Lawrence's May 30 letter.
subsequent to the August 18, 1980 meeting, Mr. svilar requested
the Spors to respond to the prepayment of the monies loaned to
Gold spor by Crested Butte (Exh. P-18).

No further mention of

the other proposals by Spors' legal counsel was made.
issue remaining was the prepayment of the loan.

The only

It is

significant to note that no steps were taken by either party
after May 1980 to fulfill the terms of the preincorporation
agreement.
Appellant's argument that a material fact exists is without
merit because on May 22, 1981 counsel for Respondents wrote
stating that the November 3, 1980 check had not cleared the
bank.

The letter further stated the "full repayment of the
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loan is the final matter to be taken care of in regard to the
Gold spor Company matters with Crested Butte.
P-29)

•

{Exh.

In light of this fact, counsel enclosed a release for

crested Butte's signature to be signed after the check was
deposited.

The release returned both parties to the status

quo, releasing each from all claims relating to the
preincorporation agreement.
Appellant wrote back asking that a replacement check be
sent for the November 3, 1980 check.
the release.

Nothing was said about

On June 19, 1981 counsel for Respondents sent a

replacement check along with a second copy of the release
asking for Appellant's signature.
and failed to sign the release.

Appellant cashed the check
A reading of the release

(attached to Exh. P-29) does not indicate that anything other
than an accord and satisfaction of all claims was intended.
Appellant further suggests that the alleged misconduct by
the Spors induced Crested Butte to accept the rescission.
Appellant's claim is without merit.

Assuming that the alleged

misconduct is true, Appellant fails to demonstrate a
relationship between said conduct and the rescission
discussions which were held in August 1980 or during the
six-month period of accepting prepayment checks from the
Spors.

Crested Butte knew of the negotiations between the

Spors and Candelaria.

Crested Butte knew that the money to

prepay the loan was coming from Candelaria.

Crested Butte's

counsel knew of a written consent relative to the issuance of
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stock to the Spors and admits that he did not submit such a
consent with respect to Crested Butte.

Appellant fails to

allege that Messrs. Svilar and Larsen were directors of Gold
spor.

With this knowledge of alleged fraudulent activity,

crested Butte continued to accept prepayment checks and two
releases without objection.

There is no indication of any kind

that anything happened from the deposit of the last check until
the June 29, 1981 letter of Mr. Hooper intending to sue which
would excuse crested Butte's acceptance of the last check.
There simply exists no issues of material fact to be presented
to the fact finder.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's entry of summary judgment on behalf of
Respondents was appropriate.

According to Appellant's own

writings, it agreed to rescind on the basis that the loan it
had made be prepaid shortly after the August 18, 1980 meeting.
Appellant's contention that the loan prepayments were a
precondition to entering into settlement negotiations is
without merit.

Appellant's stated intentions were to receive

the payments and then commence suit.

Moreover, Appellant could

not (1) receive the written release with the request that it be
signed by Appellant; (2) request a replacement check; (3)
receive the replacement check along with a second copy of the
release with another request that it must be executed; and (4)
accept the check and ignore the release.

-29-

Acceptance of the

checks tendered with the clear intention that its acceptance
satisfies disputed claims operates as an accord and
satisfaction.
Furthermore, Appellant's argument that the alleged
misconduct on the part of the Spors renders the rescission
agreement voidable is without merit.

Taking the allegations

of

misconduct as true, Appellant fails to demonstrate a
relationship between the conduct and the rescission
negotiations three months later.

Appellant also fails to

demonstrate that it learned anything concerning the Candelaria
lease during the ten days between the time it received the last
payment and release and the time it notified Gold Spor of its
intention to sue.

Appellant fails to present the court

evidence which would enable the trier of fact to conclude that
Crested Butte's acceptance of th rescission offer is not
binding.
Respondents respectfully request that the trial court's
ruling be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of January, 1984 .

. Pehrson
SENIOR
Attorneys for Respondents
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 532-1900
&
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certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing

Brief of Respondents, with postage prepaid thereon, to each of
the following

this

!2.

day of January, 1984:

H. Wayne Wadsworth
R. L. Knuth
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Robert H. Wilde
2641 South 3270 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-R
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RECEIPT AND RELEASE
In consideration of the mutual releases herein contained,
and effective upon the execution hereof by all of the parties
named below, the parties hereby agree as follows:
Gold-Spor Mining Company, Chad A. Spor, Ray Spor, Paul

c. Spor, Spor Brothers Motor Company, and Spors Incorporated
each hereby waive and release any and all claims against Crested
Butte Mining Company Incorporated arising under the Agreement to
Incorporate entered into with Crested Butte Silver Mining Incorporated
and dated July 30, 1979, or out of any and all actions or failures
to act pursuant to said Agreement, or in connection with the
incorporation and operation of Gold-Spor Mining Company prior to
the date hereof.
Crested Butte Mining Company Incorporated hereby waives and
releases any and all claims against Gold-Spor Mining Company,
Chad A. Spor, Ray Spor, Paul

c.

Spor, Spor Brothers Motor Company

and Spors Incorporated arising under the Agreement to Incorporate
entered into with said parties and dated July 30, 1979, or in
connection with the loan by Crested Butte Silver Mining to GoldSpor Mining Company made pursuant to said Agreement, or arising
out of any other actions or failures to act pursuant to said
Agreement to Incorporate or in connection with the incorporation or
operation of Gold-Spor Mining Company prior to the date hereof.

Appendix "A"

J

crested Butte Silver Mining Incorporated further hereby
acknowledges receipt and payment in full from Gold-Spor Mining
company of all principal and interest accrued on the loan made to
Gold-Spor Mining Company pursuant to said Agreement to Incorporate.
EFFECTIVE as of the

day of
GOLD-SPOR MINING COMPANY

Chad A. Spor

SPORS BROTHERS MOTOR COMPANY

By

I ts

.•

'f? J'U,.¢....>

)

SPORS INCORPORATED

CRESTED BUTTE MINING COMPANY
INCORPORATED

I
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